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Creative Integration and Pragmatist 
Optimism: Dispositions for  
“the Task Before Us”1
Barbara S. Stengel
We must be on guard
Against despair, against fear,
Against bitterness, against self-seeking,
And have the tenacity and courage
To think optimistically and act affirmatively
—John McQuiston II, Always We Begin Again2
Alice laughed. “There’s no use trying,” she said: “one can’t 
believe impossible things.”
“I daresay you haven’t had much practice,” said the Queen. 
“When I was your age, I always did it for half-an-hour a 
day. Why, sometimes I’ve believed as many as six impos-
sible things before breakfast.”
—Through the Looking-Glass, and What Alice Found 
There (1871), Lewis Carroll
Abstract
How can and will educators in any setting work with young people of all ages to 
enable them to develop the ability to interrogate—without denigrating—the claims 
of candidates, the newsmaking of media, the needs of their neighbors, and the 
fears of their family members? The answer I offer and defend here involves two 
dispositions—creative integration and pragmatist optimism—that I view as criti-
cal to the pursuit of vibrant and viable political democracy. These dispositions are, 
I argue, necessary to and evidence of the very possibility of a polity worthy of the 
“democratic” label.
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In the wake of the November 2016 presidential election, countless commentators 
recognized what Richard Rorty knew in 1998, that the U.S. democratic system 
would crack under the weight of social and economic inequalities and inequities—
and that those cracking the safe would be not the historically marginalized but the 
historically privileged. Hear Rorty nearly 20 years ago:
[M]embers of labor unions, and unorganized unskilled workers, will sooner 
or later realize that their government is not even trying to prevent wages 
from sinking or to prevent jobs from being exported. Around the same 
time, they will realize that suburban white-collar workers—themselves 
desperately afraid of being downsized—are not going to let themselves be 
taxed to provide social benefits for anyone else.
At that point, something will crack. The nonsuburban electorate will decide 
that the system has failed and start looking around for a strongman to vote 
for—someone willing to assure them that, once he is elected, the smug 
bureaucrats, tricky lawyers, overpaid bond salesmen, and postmodernist 
professors will no longer be calling the shots. . . .
One thing that is very likely to happen is that the gains made in the past 40 
years by black and brown Americans, and by homosexuals, will be wiped 
out. Jocular contempt for women will come back into fashion. . . . All the 
resentment which badly educated Americans feel about having their man-
ners dictated to them by college graduates will find an outlet.3
The point is not Rorty’s prescience nor the 2016 pollsters’ failings but the clear 
implication that the vitality of political democracy relies on more than enforced 
civil rights and access to the voting booth. As John Dewey understood early on, 
democracy as “a mode of associated living” was and is the grounding for political 
democracy that works. Community is not a function of proximity but of commu-
nication, of community making. Affect theorist Lauren Berlant expresses this for 
postmodern ears in a way that Dewey might accept as she explores the “embodied 
processes of making solidarity itself.”4 This, I argue, is the “task before us”5 as U.S. 
citizens in the early twenty-first century.
My particular challenge in this paper is to explore a question I posed to my 
students—future social studies teachers—shortly after the last presidential election. 
I asked them to imagine how they would teach social studies to ensure that this 
never happened again. This was not the election of Donald Trump, but the clear 
clash of horizons evident among the inhabitants of the United States in the pres-
ent era—at the time of the election and now as we ponder possibilities for health 
care, equitable employment, and just policing as well as wrestling with who is to 
be believed and whose lives matter. How could and would these soon-to-be teach-
ers of history and government and economics work with young people of all ages 
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to enable them to develop the ability to interrogate—without denigrating—the 
claims of candidates, the news making of media, the needs of their neighbors, and 
the fears of their family members? But let me be clear, this educational task cannot 
be left to a particular subset of teachers. It’s a challenge for anyone who educates in 
any role, within any institution, for any aged population.
The answer I offer and defend here involves two dispositions—creative inte-
gration and pragmatist optimism—that I view as critical to the pursuit of vibrant 
and viable political democracy. Admittedly, creative integration and pragmatist 
optimism practiced by individual Americans would not be enough. Layers of 
political structures and supporting social functioning overlay and undergird these 
apparently individual dispositions. Nonetheless, these dispositions are, I argue, 
necessary to and evidence of the very possibility of a polity worthy of the “demo-
cratic” label. Moreover, these dispositions are properly the concern of those who 
take up the task of education, within schools or outside.
I begin with a brief discussion of the power of disposition, or “habit” as 
Dewey characterized it. I acknowledge the importance of recognizing disposi-
tions as situated in social arrangements, that is, as post hoc indicators of demo-
cratic institutions, as much as individual traits that contribute to the construction 
of such institutions. Then I consider each critical disposition in turn, beginning 
with pragmatist optimism. 
Pragmatist optimism is set against other possible variants—naive optimism, 
learned optimism, (over)confident optimism, and cruel optimism—to highlight its 
particular character as the tendency to focus on what I can do combined with the 
recognition that the meaning of my actions can only be judged post hoc in the light 
of actual impacts within problematized contexts. 
Creative integration is drawn here based on the framing and phrasing of a 
pragmatist theorist of organizations and government, Mary Parker Follett. In the 
face of conflict—and there will inevitably be conflict in a diverse social milieu—cre-
ative integration refuses domination and replaces compromise as the only available 
responses. Follett starts with the pragmatist recognition that diversity is a critical 
condition for growth—and insists, in her own practice of pragmatist optimism, 
that creative integration not only “resolves” specific conflict, but transforms con-
flict (social or intellectual) into the source of invention.
I conclude with some preliminary thoughts about whether and how these 
dispositions can be encouraged through intentional education and thoughtful 
societal interaction.
A Word about Dispositions
Educators and epistemologists have unwittingly conspired to divide qualification 
for any human practice into knowledge, skill, and disposition. Unfortunately, 
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dividing qualities that can ultimately only be judged experientially into a set of 
discrete (and quite possibly misleading) categories is potentially useful (for certain 
specified purposes), but always also dangerous. And it is doubly dangerous when 
the categories are operationalized in ways that separate cognition from affect and 
activity. Perhaps even more misleading is the implication that knowledge, skill, and 
disposition are individual characteristics or possessions rather than socially consti-
tuted and maintained in situated (and often institutionalized) interaction. Whether 
I am a good teacher or a good attorney or a good gardener or a good citizen is not 
a pure calculus of my knowledge (as measured by some sort of “test”), my skill (as 
determined by an artificial task), and my disposition (as assessed by an observant 
other). Goodness depends on function appraised holistically. Am I functioning as 
a good gardener? This will become evident in the quality and appearance of the 
gardens I tend and the yield produced. Am I functioning as a good democratic citi-
zen? This is reflected in the collective action of my fellow citizens and the quality 
of the polity within which I live. At present, it is evident that we are not collectively 
functioning as good citizens. “Creative democracy” remains an ongoing challenge.
Knowledge, skill, and disposition are all implicated in this democratic failure, 
but each category is implicated in a different way. Knowledge is in question as a cat-
egory that matters at all in public deliberation, skill is under threat because of a system 
of accountability that has not taken actual communication seriously as an educational 
goal in all fields, and disposition is toothless because it has been reduced to attitudes.
The problem with respect to knowledge is not just that we disagree on basic 
facts (the climate is changing; no, it isn’t) nor that we cling to claims that are wrong 
(there is substantial evidence of voter fraud), nor that we fail to demand or offer 
justificatory evidence for important claims. The problem is that knowledge as a 
category useful in civic discourse is under fire, and processes for ascertaining what 
we know are routinely dismissed as unimportant or ignored in the making of civic 
decisions. Moreover, we fail to acknowledge that any designation of “knowledge” 
is the product of power relations.6
Interestingly, “twenty-first-century skills,” typically framed as collaboration 
and teamwork, creativity and imagination, critical thinking and problem solving are 
valued, at least rhetorically. However, this cluster of skills doesn’t explicitly articulate 
communication. More important, not one of these skills is actually assessed in any 
of the high-stakes testing that governs school improvement or student qualification.
The concept of disposition actually offers us more to grab onto. However, 
we have reduced dispositions to affects and attitudes, rather than see them as the 
full-throated flexible habits that Dewey documents and recommends. When we 
describe a person as gritty or patriotic or hard-working or responsible, we fail to 
acknowledge that what we assign to an individual as a trait is actually a post hoc 
assignment of meaning to a complex social situation in which (inter)action results 
in substantive and significant consequence. 
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The notion of disposition that I rely on here is captured in John Dewey’s expo-
sition of habit, found in Human Nature and Conduct7 and elsewhere. Dispositions, 
like Deweyan habits, are tendencies—developed in and through experience—to act 
in useful and predictable ways in similar circumstances. The habit of courage is not 
a feeling of bravery, but the tendency to assess a threatening situation and respond 
intelligently (neither fearfully nor foolheartedly) over and over again.
Habit is not habituation, a rote, thoughtless reaction. Habit is forged in expe-
rience, flexibly marshalled to respond to challenging circumstances, and perhaps 
the clearest indicator of one’s character as responsible. 
No amount of knowledge alone, no prescribed behaviors divorced of feeling 
or idea, no “appropriate” attitudes can motivate or explain responsible behavior. 
It is rather an amalgam, this cognitive-behavioral-affective nexus Dewey called 
“habit.” I have come to believe, with Dewey and Aristotle before him, that forming 
dispositions is the primary educational goal, or at least the most generative point 
of entry—no matter what the field of human practice. I am not alone in this view. 
Sarah Stitzlein’s work on habit (published in Education and Culture and elsewhere)8 
frames habits and their importance in much the same way.
With Dewey and Stitzlein, I acknowledge the importance of recognizing dispo-
sitions as situated in social arrangements, that is, as post hoc indicators of democratic 
institutions, as much as individual traits that contribute to the construction of such 
institutions. Dewey conceives of the development of habit using the “reflex circuit”9 so 
characteristic of his thinking. Persons act within institutions that act back on persons in 
the same dialectical transaction. The habits I can enact are limited by the constraints of 
institutions even as I act to push back the limits of those institutions. The point of this is 
that education as the development of habits of democratic responsibility is never simply a 
matter of “fixing” persons, but always also a matter of reconstructing social arrangements.
If creative democracy is the task before us, that is, if we seek to educate 
ourselves and our fellow citizens to enact democracy as the frame for human 
flourishing, what are the dispositions—as individual habits and affordances of 
organizations—that can best orient our efforts? The two dispositions I have in mind 
bring feeling, thinking, and doing together in the way Dewey describes and are criti-
cal reconstructions of classical pragmatist ideas. I begin with pragmatist optimism.
Pragmatist Optimism
Pragmatist optimism is an aspirational framing that I contrast with naïve optimism 
(a position more romantic than pragmatist), learned optimism (rooted in a posi-
tive psychology that chooses and trains optimism over pessimism), (over)confident 
optimism (an amalgam of confidence combined with the ignorance of inexperi-
ence), and cruel optimism (Berlant’s diagnosis of the dangers of being an optimist 
in a world disorganized by neoliberalism and postmodern sensibility). Dewey 
himself might have called pragmatist optimism, as I construe it, “meliorism,” but 
E&C    Education and Culture
22    B. S. Stengel
that term seems too alien to contemporary sensibilities to make use of. For Dewey, 
“Meliorism is the belief that the specific conditions which exist at one moment, be 
they comparatively bad or comparatively good, in any event may be bettered. It 
encourages intelligence to study the positive means of good and the obstructions 
to their realization, and to put forth endeavor for the improvement of conditions.”10 
For now, note simply that Dewey’s pragmatist optimism (his meliorism) is marked 
by an orientation toward the better effected by intelligent action.
 To be a pragmatist optimist is to (a) focus on what “I can . . .” do rather than 
on that over which I have no control, (b) to recognize that meaning—of encounters 
or events or expressions—is a function of intelligent assessment of the impact those 
have on and in the world, and (c) to do this in contexts that are already problema-
tized, that is, acknowledged as fraught with both danger and utility.
I am placing my marbles on optimism, not hope, as the term of art here—
though I know that not all will agree.11 However, viewed generally, the theological, 
indeed eschatological, implications of the term “hope” are off-putting for me. And 
I am haunted by the turning of hope from former American president Obama to 
current president Trump. That hope could be deeply invested in two such disparate 
figures at one time makes it difficult for me to make meaningful use of the concept 
of hope in this essay.
I confess, too, that I am an optimist, called to be such both internally and 
externally. As I described it not long ago:
The internal call is born of both realism and faith and woven into the way 
I read the world. I have a realistic read on my own capacities and motiva-
tions (including the weaknesses and darker shades) and those of my fellow 
inhabitants of this perplexing time and place. But my lived experience and 
my desire to live well encourage a faithful and patient pursuit of the better. 
Both experience and desire suggest that when social conditions allow, those 
living alongside me generally—though not universally—are also pursuing 
the better, each of us in our fashion. That is enough to let me see living 
optimistically as the more attractive path, as a road that can be made by 
walking (to borrow the idiom used by Myles Horton and Paulo Freire).
The external call comes from my long-time commitment to and identity as 
an educator. To pursue education, one’s own or another’s, is to believe that 
change is possible and that education matters. Education makes different 
the way one fashions life actions and makes different as well the choices 
one perceives in the world. To be an educator—and I am, inescapably—is 
to see paths that are better and worse and to believe that finding the better 
path is both worthwhile and possible, even likely.12
So the question for me is not optimism vs. hope, but what does optimism 
look like in a “broken society,” as David Brooks13 characterized the United States 
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seven years ago? Is there an optimistic practice that can sustain (especially urban 
and rural) educators who cannot avoid the existential and psychological need of 
their talented but deeply disadvantaged students? I offer pragmatist optimism of 
a critical variety.
Critical pragmatist optimism is evident in working for good in the face of 
an acknowledgment that the good is elusive—in both meaning and attainment. 
It is more than “realistic” optimism. As a critical pragmatist optimist, I am not 
merely chastened by the recognition of circumstances that make improvement 
seem impossible; rather, I understand that the very recognition of so-called reality 
is itself a function of the judgment made about the meaning of efforts in the world. 
The pragmatist optimist knows that the meaning of her efforts can be found not in 
good intention or appropriate ideology but in results actually effected and valued. 
She knows that success is not guaranteed and that the very meaning of success is 
determinable only after result has been connected to action intelligently.
To make sense of critical pragmatist optimism, I contrast it with four other 
forms of optimism that may sometimes be useful, but that are not, I argue, ulti-
mately generative and sustainable: naive optimism, learned optimism, (over)confi-
dent optimism, and cruel optimism. If optimism is a critical element of an educator’s 
being in the world—and I maintain that it is—I ask, what is the most educative 
practice of optimism?
Before taking up the four unsustainable types of optimism as I have observed 
and constructed them, I note that Dewey himself, despite an intellectual demeanor 
that some would describe as overly optimistic about the achievement of social 
and individual good, was not a fan of optimism. At least he thought to critique 
optimism in multiple ways as “complacent optimism,”14 “loose and ineffective 
optimism,”15 “pious optimism,”16 “popular credulous optimism,”17 “romantic opti-
mism,”18 “easy optimism” (which he linked with “supine complacency”!),19 undue 
optimism,”20 “uncritical optimism,”21 “exaggerated optimism,”22 “complacent opti-
mism,”23 “inflated optimism,”24 “very cheap and harmful optimism,”25 “foolish 
optimism,” 26 and the characterization that gets to the heart of the matter for Dewey, 
“unthinking optimism.”27 It is clear from this list that Dewey had in mind some 
practices of optimism similar to those I discuss below.
Naïve optimism is simple, too unexamined to be a “practice,” too uncritical 
to be meaningful. This brand of optimism resides in a Pollyanna-like belief that 
good things are more likely to happen to me than to others because I am me and 
I somehow deserve it. There is self-centeredness propping up naïve optimism, but 
more important for my purposes is the sentimentalism that is at its core. Lacking 
in the naïve optimist is a theory of evil, an acknowledgment of tragedy, and the 
recognition that persistence toward a valued goal is both desirable and difficult.
Young children tend to be naïve optimists and this often, but not always, 
serves them well. It supports the willing action that makes learning possible. The 
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very process of education is a gradual replacement of naïve optimism with a more 
informed, less dangerous optimism that affords willing action while guarding 
against personal harm. The challenge is to find the sweet spot between openness 
and guardedness, to avoid “maturity” (as incapable of growth) in favor of “matur-
ing” (developed but open to further development).
 (Over)confident optimism is akin to what sixteenth-century British poet 
Samuel Daniel calls “audacious ignorance.” (“While timorous knowledge stands 
considering, audacious ignorance hath done the deed.”)28 While positively associ-
ated with the development of adolescents and young adults, it can also be perceived 
among many of today’s educational reformers. Figures like Betsy DeVos and an 
entire phalanx of Teach for America-corps-members-turned-educational-saviors, 
inexperienced, underqualified, and too often just misguided, assume that the 
understanding they have is the understanding they need to respond pedagogically, 
ethically, and politically to very real educational challenges in the face of systemic 
racism, entrenched and normalized poverty, and all that goes with that.29 In the 
(over)confident optimist, we find the self-centeredness evident among naïve opti-
mists but without the sentimentalism. Their grit and commitment are unquestioned 
(at least within the inner circle of “educational reformers”)—and seemingly all that 
is needed to dissolve previously intractable educational challenges. 
We see this kind of attitude in President Trump’s claim during the 2016 
Republican National Convention that “I alone can fix it,” clearly a model of (over)
confident optimism. His “audacious ignorance” is regularly on display, but there 
is an even more distressing element to this brand of optimism. The practitioners 
of (over)confident optimism “succeed” because they set the terms of the very pos-
sibility of success. For President Trump, this involves declaring victory without 
reference to evidence and castigating those who question the conclusion as “fake 
news.” (His claims with respect to Hurricane Maria’s impact on Puerto Rico con-
stitute a remarkable case in point.) For educational reformers, cherry-picking good 
students and limiting the purposes of education to an achievement based on test 
scores narrowly define the terms for success. Those who would actually educate 
are at a disadvantage.
Learned optimism is a contemporary corollary of Martin Seligman’s positive 
psychology. In my youth, we knew positive psychology as “the power of positive 
thinking,”30 an idea that was literally sold to those who wanted to be successful in 
business and in life. Today we are selling “grit” and “growth mindset” as critical 
for optimal motivation and performance,31 and lots of people seem to be internal-
izing this perspective. While both of these notions came to light as careful and 
well-regarded programs of research by Angela Duckworth and Carol Dweck (as did 
Seligman’s positive psychology), they have been appropriated by those who, often 
simplistically, prescribe retraining pessimism in order to improve performance. 
Those who can learn to see defeats as temporary, local, and reversible (rather than 
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as indicators of personal deficit or of systemic constraint) can be not just their best 
selves, but anything they imagine themselves being. From the learned optimist’s 
point of view, the ability to reframe failure as “not yet” means that I can and will 
overcome immediate obstacles through the practice of my newly acquired persis-
tence and positivity.
Learned optimism, like other forms, is useful for specific persons in the right 
circumstances. Adults who can practice “positive thinking” are more likely to persist 
at apparently intractable problems. It is hard to deny that persistence and a posi-
tive attitude are useful capacities—but there are dangers in it as well. First, I might 
fail to learn optimism, that is, to reprogram my attitude; this view is built on an 
assumption that all can develop positive thinking. Surely, some are more talented 
at optimism-as-attitude than others who may simply fail. Second, I may actually 
learn to deny daunting and unjust circumstances well beyond my control, and turn 
on myself when I am unable to fix them or the students with whom I work. Finally, 
learned optimism seems to be a kind of optimism “for the rest of us,” that is, for 
those who don’t immediately measure up or who are not occupying positions of 
institutional power. Those who are conferred with institutional power prematurely 
tend to inhabit versions of (over)confident optimism.
Today’s educators—at least those who seek to maintain an optimism that is 
both realistic and constructive—face a double bind that Lauren Berlant analyzes 
in sophisticated theoretical terms as “cruel optimism.”32 The teachers (or adminis-
trators) who aspire to remain in their institutional role must be “effective” as mea-
sured by students’ performance (achievement or growth) on one or another set of 
standardized tests. But being effective can—and too often does—require abandon-
ing the role of teacher as educator (as one who initiates her students into ways of 
knowing and being in the world, and who invites students to recreate the world by 
building on and going beyond those ways of knowing and being)—and that moral 
motivation, that optimistic attachment grounded in some moment(s) in their own 
experience of education, is what drove them toward teaching to begin with.33
Put simply, cruel optimism “exists when something you desire is actually an 
obstacle to your flourishing.”34 The irony is clear. Optimistic attachments are not intrin-
sically cruel; optimism is intrinsic to the project of education (in fact, to any effort to 
pursue growth and/or justice), and attachment understood as relationality is a sine qua 
non of pedagogical efforts. “[Optimistic attachments] become cruel only when the object 
that draws your attachment actively impedes the aim that brought you to it initially.” 
Teachers today are stuck in a situation of cruel optimism because the social, 
political, and economic conditions surrounding the contemporary practice of 
public school teaching counter the interpersonal experience that prompted their 
interest in teaching. They are attracted to the work of teaching because of the mean-
ingfulness of attending to the growth of immature persons. However, regimes of 
accountability that feature standardized testing and rely on “growth” measures 
E&C    Education and Culture
26    B. S. Stengel
with questionable statistical pedigrees exert pressure on them to teach in ways 
that are simply not educational.
Berlant takes us beyond the concrete conditions of educational practice to the 
psychic and affective powers flowing through persons and institutions. We are—by 
virtue of being human—affected by and attracted to a fantasy of “the good life,” 
a moral–intimate–economic constellation of desire(s). But by virtue of living in 
human interaction—in real-world conditions of scarcity, imperfection, and today, 
“liquid life”35—our fantasies are subject to “fraying,” fraying too the metanarrative 
that surrounds and powers our educational possibilities.
For Berlant, “the present is perceived, first, affectively.” We are affected—per-
sonally, politically—before we understand or name that affect as object. The genre 
of response that lets us perceive this affectively constituted present is, for Berlant, 
the “impasse.” The impasse is a “stretch of time in which one moves around with a 
sense that the world is at once intensely present and enigmatic, such that the activ-
ity of living demands both a wandering absorptive awareness and a hypervigilance 
that collects material that might help to clarify things.”36
The question facing us now under conditions of impasse—as we live down 
the impacts of No Child Left Behind and live into the full flower of Trumpian trag-
edy—is whether or not any form of optimism is sensible for teachers. What is the 
optimism that dislodges cruel optimism, enabling teachers to persist in the profes-
sion because (and so that) they can be educators?37 This would be an optimism that 
is forward looking and meaning making (that is, pragmatist) but is also attentive to 
present political, ideological, and existential realities (that is, critical). Only this kind 
of optimism is actually practicable. Naïve, (over)confident, and learned optimisms 
look forward but take on various forms of unreality. Cruel optimism, perhaps the 
dominant form of optimism of the present age, leads inevitably to impasse. What 
is this critical pragmatist optimism that might move us—cognitively, affectively, 
behaviorally—despite, and perhaps beyond, impasse? 
Pragmatist optimism will be toothless unless it takes critical theory in all its 
variants seriously. It will do no good to look beyond injustice and inequity, margin-
alization and discrimination. At the same time, the function of critical theory is to 
point to that which is limiting and nongenerative. A steady diet of criticality alone 
leads to pessimism and, worse, resignation. Pragmatism picks up where criticality 
leaves off. Critical pragmatism enables and names action toward the better joined 
with awareness of the fact of limitation without reifying which limits are limits.
The pragmatist optimist is not naïve; he is not sentimental. He understands 
that both evil and tragedy are real, if socially constructed, practices of communities 
of action. The pragmatist optimist has no time for overconfidence because construc-
tive action demands intelligence and cannot proceed in ignorance. The pragma-
tist optimist recognizes that optimism is a habit that is “learned” not through 
retraining of an individual mind/perception but by acting effectively in the world 
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in interaction with others. And the pragmatist-optimist doesn’t get caught in cruel 
optimism because he asks relentlessly, “What can I do to act toward the purposes 
that I hold of most importance while negotiating and transforming purposes as 
we go?” He makes the road by walking.
The critical pragmatist-optimist is not a glutton for punishment; she prac-
tices what John Lachs calls “stoic pragmatism.”38 With John Dewey and William 
James, she both looks to the future and values “the tools that enable us to enlarge 
the range of local intelligence” here and now. With Seneca and other Stoics, she 
acknowledges the immediate limits of her powers without complaint but also with-
out complacency. There is evil and tragedy, but there is not only evil and tragedy. 
“In every case in which we want to improve something, we have to accept the con-
ditions that make amelioration possible.”39 Which conditions make amelioration 
possible is not given; it is all part of the inquiry.
Optimism is an affect tangled with particular kinds of ideas and actions. We 
tend to think of emotions like optimism as prewired character traits of the indi-
vidual, emerging spontaneously, even instinctually. But pragmatists and critical 
pragmatists remind us that emotions are better understood as products of engage-
ment with others in the world. As John Dewey noted at the turn of the twentieth 
century and as Sara Ahmed explores in the twenty-first,40 emotions are sociopo-
litically constructed habits involving affective, cognitive, and behavioral associa-
tions with objects with which we have past histories. Educators who hope to stay 
alive, to practice optimism, find themselves called to critically assess the objects 
that elicit feelings, thoughts, and actions in order to respond constructively rather 
than react unthinkingly. Moreover, those educators labor proactively to construct 
the (institutional and interactional) conditions that make optimism possible. This 
is the work Berlant calls the “embodied process of making solidarity itself.” As an 
educator, I am not Super(wo)man; I cannot sidestep the reality of current educa-
tional policy, nor retrain my thinking to ignore those same constraints, nor even 
escape the impasse that neoliberal conditions of fear and precarity construct. The 
task ahead is to see (and feel) clearly and to interact intelligently anyway.
Educators today encounter possibilities that don’t feel much like a real 
choice—between progress toward the better however modestly conceived and 
“passivity” when the perceived impasse takes over one’s attention and one’s energy. 
Author Zadie Smith recently reminded us that progress “is never permanent, will 
always be threatened, must be redoubled, restated, and reimagined if it is to sur-
vive.”41 This isn’t easy but it is a practice, a habit, the habit of optimism strength-
ened by acting with others in this world. For those who continue to see education 
as a useful tool and tactic for living well in all its forms in a world that is not easily 
tamed, it is the only choice.
This kind of critical pragmatist optimism is more easily associated with femi-
nists whose work embodies a pragmatist intention—from Jane Addams42 to Judith 
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Butler43 to Sara Ahmed44 to Lauren Berlant45 and Donna Haraway46—and in the 
pragmatism practiced today by Colin Koopman47 and Jose Medina48 than it is with 
the image of John Dewey. These scholars are more acutely aware than Dewey of the 
play of power in human interaction and the inequitable distribution of material, 
political, and epistemic goods. 
Sara Ahmed’s portrayal of the “feminist killjoy” (along with the unhappy 
queer, the angry black woman, and the melancholic migrant) is at once critical and 
constructive, seeking to bridge theory and ordinary life. Arguing that a feminist 
critique is a sensible reaction to the injustices of the world, Ahmed both portrays 
and plays the role of one who disturbs what is taken for granted for the purpose 
of offering a better alternative. “To kill joy,” she writes in the book’s introduction, 
“is to open a life, to make room for life, to make room for possibility, for chance.”49
Similarly, Donna Haraway’s insistence on “staying with the trouble,” in refus-
ing to dither in the face of difficult circumstances, in order to create new modes 
of being more together with the nonhuman inhabitants of Terra, clearly conveys 
a pragmatist stance and a relational reality. Jose Medina’s examination of episte-
mologies of resistance and ignorance also incorporates careful documentation of 
social movements and the kinds of activism that can be mobilized to resist racial 
and sexual violence and oppression in local and global contexts.
Ahmed and the other thinkers noted above share common motivating ques-
tions. The first question is, can one act constructively and democratically in the 
world in the face of diversity, disagreement, and even discord? Can one have dialogue 
across diversity? Critical pragmatist optimism answers yes. But the question of how 
remains. Developing the disposition of creative integration is a potential answer.
Creative Integration
“Creative integration” is a phrase offered by pragmatist and progressive theorist 
of management Mary Parker Follett (1996) to capture what she claims is the only 
constructive response to conflict, in a framing congruent with the thinking of John 
Dewey and Jane Addams. Follett suggests that domination (even the perception of 
domination) has devastating results—as we witnessed in the social dynamics lead-
ing up to and resulting from the November 2016 election. More surprisingly, Fol-
lett argues that compromise may be even worse than domination because nothing 
is settled and nobody is happy. Because all parties are giving up important con-
siderations, no one is making progress toward having needs fulfilled and interests 
addressed. Follett proposes creative integration—the thorough communication of 
root needs and desires on the part of all impacted with the intelligent imagination 
of alternative solutions that address what parties need to accept a tentative resolu-
tion. Follett’s nonbinary, win-win formulation (what today we might call integra-
tive rather than distributive negotiation)50 rests on her understanding of power as a 
function of human relating with the goal of “power with” rather than “power over.”
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To understand “creative integration” (or coordination) as Follett commends it to 
us requires that we check our understanding of the concept and experience of power. 
The creation and use of power are, as John Dewey suggested in another context, “strictly 
correlative and contemporaneous.”51 They are mutually constituting. One does not 
obtain power and then use it. Rather, one comes to have power in the exercise of it. To 
be a causal agent is to create new value, and this can only be done coactively: “power 
with/to.” New value is always jointly developed in interaction with others in the world.
Follett argued that power could be defined as “simply the ability to make 
things happen, to be a causal agent, to initiate change.”52 This is not a personal 
phenomenon, but an interactive one rooted in “the law of the situation.” This phe-
nomenological characterization sets no limits on the amount of power available 
and pushes us toward a generative, agentic understanding of power. Our agency, 
unquestionably constrained by sociocultural context but never fully determined, 
reveals the borders of the values we enact. Thus the power of power is captured 
in Follett’s claim that “power means the possibility of creating new values.”53 This 
possibility emerges when we take conflict to be constructive.
Follett rejects domination (power over) and compromise (mutual powerless-
ness?) as effective modes of response to conflict and insists that creative integration 
is the only response that reduces resentment while generating rather than limit-
ing power. Follett’s view—both progressive and pragmatist—raises the prospect 
of “expansion” rather than “shrinking” for all parties involved, an attitude that is 
richly educative. She does not accept the power calculus that views the distribu-
tion of power as a zero-sum game. The friction accompanying conflict—too often 
construed as “power struggle”—is an energy awaiting release through a process of 
coordinated activity that mirrors Dewey’s method of intelligence.54
Those who would switch from personal power to the “law of the situation” are 
bound to accept Follett’s four fundamental principles of organization, principles 
that she considered basic to effective management coordination: 
• Coordination as the “Reciprocal Relating” of all factors in a situation, 
• Coordination by direct contact, that is, direct communication between 
all responsible people involved, whatever their hierarchical or depart-
mental positions, 
• Coordination in the early stages—involving all the people directly con-
cerned from the initial stages of designing a project or forming a policy, 
and 
• Coordination as a continuing process, coordinating on a continuous 
basis, and recognizing that there is no such thing as unity, but only the 
continuous process of unifying. 
Coordination is needed because conflict, suggests Follett, is neither positive 
or negative; it is not even surprising. It just is, and it is even predictable for those 
paying attention. Says Follett: “As conflict—difference—is here in the world, as 
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we cannot avoid it, we should, I think, use it.” In statements that sound much like 
those of Jane Addams, she argues that we should make conflict work for us, as the 
engineer uses friction to do work.55
No matter what their position or expertise, those who claim a privileged epis-
temic and political perspective based on their educational status (including perhaps 
this author and the readers of this journal) are indulging in paternalism and missing 
something critical to Follett’s view of coordination and Dewey’s formulation of democ-
racy. Solutions to shared problems cannot be determined and then “sold.” Actual solu-
tions, that is solutions that don’t result in resistance to domination and resentment of 
compromise, are always negotiated. This is the process of associated living that Dewey 
describes. It enacts the communication that expresses and creates community.
It may seem as though Follett is recommending a protocol for action in poli-
tics and business, one that can be implemented by an individual at will (or not). 
However, this would be a misreading of her intention. Follett is not simply suggest-
ing that those in institutional positions of power gather the troops when conflict 
emerges. She is arguing for a flattened and flexible organizational structure that 
assumes, even welcomes, conflict as generative. It is just such a structural context 
that makes the practice of creative integration (as a disposition) possible. 
Direct contact is not easy to facilitate if it is only initiated in an affect-fraught 
emergency within a hierarchical organization. Communication in the early stages 
of a conflict is only possible if regular opportunities for direct contact among all 
constituencies are built into the way an organization works. This is the root of a 
continuous process of unifying, rather than an elusive ideal of unity.
All of this builds and is dependent on the capacity of all parties to reveal what 
they really want and need in any “situation.” As Follett suggests, creative integration 
involves “fac[ing] the real issue, uncover[ing] the conflict, bring[ing] the whole thing 
out into the open.”56 This takes trust, a trust that grounds possibilities for commu-
nication but is also made possible by that regular communication. Once needs are 
honestly and accurately expressed, the participants are tasked with finding “the law 
of the situation.” This takes intelligence (the kind of thinking together in interaction 
that Dewey documents)—and it takes time. The initial goal is to complexify what 
is too often presented as a binary choice in favor of “invention” of a new alterna-
tive—or what Follett calls “creative integration.” Like feminists after her, she urges 
us to avoid binary thinking, “thinking confined within the walls of these two pos-
sibilities.” She advocates expansive thinking, a habit of which Dewey would approve.
What is being invented is value as well as embodied response. Participants 
in creative integration are not only examining options for action. They also claim 
values and evaluate their own and others’ claims, leading to revaluation in a man-
ner akin to Dewey’s Theory of Valuation.57 What Follett terms progress occurs by 
the revaluation of desire. This is a not a question of persons ‘giving in,’ but rather 
of realizing that they don’t really care about that, if they can get this.
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There is pragmatist optimism built into this position in that one cannot know 
in advance the resolution to any conflict. The disposition to act in the service of coor-
dination requires optimism, an assumption that a truly (or at least more) positive 
outcome is at least possible. The key to recognizing this as a pragmatist response is 
that the pragmatist recognizes both the truth and the limits of the positions seem-
ingly in conflict and then searches for an intelligent response that acknowledges 
those limits while reframing the original issue or question in a more useful way. 
This reframing is the opening to invention. 
As noted, the practice of coordination is a function of individual disposition 
and social organization. We recognize it in the results it makes possible, in solu-
tions invented and agreements reached that involve neither domination nor com-
promise. An individual who has experienced democratic functioning can attempt 
to coordinate in stressful situations, but coordination is not individual power. It is 
a mode of associated living, embodied in organizational arrangement.
Those who wield institutional power cannot delegate it to those who don’t 
because, says Follett, “genuine power is capacity. . . . It is the blossoming of expe-
rience. The challenge facing those without power . . . is how much power they can 
grow themselves. . . . The division of power is not the thing to be considered, but that 
method of organization that will generate power.” In fact, the institutional power of 
individuals will, in most circumstances, actually erode overall organizational and 
social achievement. This is why Follett shifts the focus to the “law of the situation” 
as it emerges from coordination and cooperation. Partnership is quite literally more 
powerful than hierarchical control and the competition it engenders.
Follett insists that institutions should be organized so that in any conflict, the 
whole field of desire can be viewed. She recommends the realignment of (working) 
groups to enable the revaluation of interests. Once an inclusive working group is 
possible, the members are called to find and focus on the significant rather than 
the dramatic features of the situation and seek or construct the response that is 
“circular.” Reminiscent of Dewey’s claim in “The Reflex Arc Concept in Psychol-
ogy,”58 Follett understands the circular response as one that recognizes and accepts 
responsibility for responding never just to you, but always to you plus me. “Circu-
lar behavior as the basis of integration gives us the key to constructive conflict.”59
However, organizational arrangements are not enough to ensure the practice 
of coordination when individual persons have no experience of standing up and 
speaking out. Systems of inequity train individuals to view themselves as more 
or less worthy, more or less capable of engaging in the kind of deliberation Follett 
describes. Epistemic injustice,60 woven into the fabric of racism, sexism, classism, 
and other inequitable social habits and arrangements, makes imagining either 
organizational structures or personal dispositions of creative integration difficult. 
The practice of creative integration is not the default habit in twenty- 
first-century America. We are generally impatient and, sadly, habituated to 
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domination and compromise. Our language tends toward the binary rather than 
the integrative. Creative integration takes time, can be stressful, and does not always 
yield practicable action. Follett recognized this, as she is not the naïve optimist 
some still think her to be.
Nonetheless, this is an important counter to my argument for creative inte-
gration as a “disposition for the task before us,” one that requires some explora-
tion. Put simply, is creative integration an overly optimistic stance in a political 
and cultural environment where difference is defined as divisive? Does creative 
integration belie the very possibility of critical optimism? Am I asking that we 
imagine and work toward the impossible?
 Integration is not possible in all cases, but as a life stance, as a disposition, 
Follett viewed creative integration as far more fruitful than the alternatives (just 
as democracy is the worst form of government except for all the others). Like the 
pragmatist she was, she argued that we can only know the limits of creative inte-
gration by enacting the practice. The enactment reveals “what perhaps may be. This 
we can discover only by experiment.”61
Whether Follett did or did not understand the political realities and ineq-
uities we recognize today, whatever naivete she harbored in the early years of the 
twentieth century, she did not believe that integration was possible in all cases: “I 
do not say there is no tragedy in life. All I say is that if we were alive to its advan-
tages, we could often integrate instead of compromising.”62
With this statement, Follett expresses her own pragmatist optimism. She rec-
ognizes the “high order of intelligence, keen perception and discrimination, brilliant 
inventiveness” that creative integration asks of those who would live democrati-
cally. She acknowledges the courage that it requires to resist the pull of the either/
or formulation of conflict. She remains the optimist because the coordinated result, 
once achieved, has little to none of the residual resentment and dissatisfaction of 
compromise or the resistance that domination must stimulate. 
Of course, creative integration will not “work” every time—or quickly—
even in those organizations that are planned to make it possible. It can take weeks, 
months, years to find a workable response to conflicting interests, but the operating 
principle (the disposition at work) is to see and acknowledge the very real disagree-
ments, but to look hard for the shared interests and build what can be built on those 
shared interests. That will change the operating conditions, making new (small) 
common ground possible. This is the democracy Dewey calls us to—and creative 
integration is a democratic disposition enacted today in some political action, edu-
cational work, and academic discourse, especially by women.
The Women’s March of January 2017, the “Nevertheless, She Persisted” meme-
turned-campaign in response to Elizabeth Warren’s experience with Senate leader 
Mitch McConnell, the #MeToo movement, and the valorization of the “Notori-
ous RBG” are all indicators of a critical pragmatic optimism afoot in the land 
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of #MAGA. The proliferation of children’s and young adult literature by authors 
who are female, of color, LGBT, with disability, and immigrant written to portray 
in high-quality narratives the actual experience of youth who represent the same 
range of humanity have reinvigorated publishing targeted toward young people 
and utterly reconstructed the face of reading in the public schools. Feminist and 
womanist theory of all stripes continues to be written and debated, but always from 
a both/and perspective (both intellectual and material) with an insistence on the 
possibility that win-win (rather than win-lose) is a desirable outcome.
All of these indicators represent intelligent action in the face of challenging 
circumstances. They represent as well a stance of inclusion rather than exclusion, 
of creative integration wrought through intelligent effort together over time.
From Construct to Disposition
How do theoretical constructs become commonplace dispositions? Dewey’s answer, 
of course, is to educate for pragmatist optimism and creative integration. As any 
reader of Democracy and Education knows, however, this is not a simple matter of 
developing a dispositional curriculum that teachers can deliver to future citizens. 
Education is a situated transaction. Those who would themselves practice these 
dispositions, this fusion of idea and affect and act, will only develop them through 
experience, that personal encounter with others and the world that is always both 
individual and social. Only environments (social, natural, or organizational) struc-
tured to enact pragmatist optimism and creative integration support the experience 
that forges dispositions that are flexible habit and not habituation. The reality (acces-
sible in today’s various forms of critical appraisal) is that most institutions are not 
structured in this generative way. However, the good news is that small spaces can be 
constructed—within families, classrooms, schools, book clubs, scout troops, athletic 
teams, academic departments, work crews, even churches—by those who intend to 
imagine pragmatist optimism and creative integration until they can experience it.
The far more difficult challenge is to move beyond, to take this inquiry to the 
question of how widely available educational channels (public and paid television; 
social, print, and broadcast media; and public libraries) and political institutions 
(political parties, PACs, governmental entities) are exacerbating the situation of 
conflicting horizons and might contribute instead to the creation of community, 
to the embodied processes of making solidarity itself. 
The practice of schooling today is not improving our prospects. High-stakes 
accountability continues to get in the way of expansive but also realistic expecta-
tions. Our reliance on “measurable goals” of putatively useful subjects rather than 
actual indicators of human growth has led to gutting the curriculum at all levels. 
Mathematics and reading are viewed as the only goods; the arts, literature, even 
sciences are not valued and too often not part of the curriculum at all. We need 
E&C    Education and Culture
34    B. S. Stengel
new indicators of success in education that can serve as aspirational ends-in-view.
Still, there are persons in our world, in our educational circles, who practice 
critical pragmatist optimism and creative integration. This is why both Dewey 
and Follett were able to provide phenomenological descriptions of them. Neither 
invented these dispositions ex nihilo; rather, they recognized and help us still to 
recognize that responsible people act in these ways, if inconsistently. And when 
these dispositions are broadly enacted, democracy exists.
I suggest that neither disposition alone is a sufficient condition for democratic 
functioning. Both are needed—not as attitude and skill, but as complementary 
tendencies to act infused with positive feeling and useful thought. But these two 
dispositions are not a simple answer. In a pragmatist reading, these two disposi-
tions matter because they make something possible, maybe even—in the right cir-
cumstances—make something seemingly impossible possible.
In the opening of this essay, John McQuiston calls on us to “have the tenacity 
and courage to think optimistically and act affirmatively.” This is not a new idea 
(McQuiston finds it in The Rule of St. Benedict63), but it links pragmatist optimism 
and creative integration to tenacity and courage. As I have been thinking about 
these two dispositions, I have been thinking and writing as well about courage 
revisioned for a critical feminist, situated, and communal understanding of human 
action.64 McQuiston, and my colleague Terri Wilson, have pointed out to me that 
these two projects are interconnected. 
It requires courage to believe the impossible is possible and to act as if that were 
the case. But courage is not heroic and individual. Courage is also an embodied process 
of making solidarity itself, constructed and supported in communities of interaction.
What is still needed today, as it was in Dewey and Follett’s time, is both cour-
age and the capacity to see and highlight these dispositions in practice so that these 
modes of response are regularly externalized, eventually legitimated, and ultimately 
internalized. And what is needed as well are institutional supports and constraints, 
the concrete institutions already in place but too often taken for granted. For edu-
cators, the task before us is both pedagogical and political.
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